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During this Survey period,1 Texas courts issued opinions analyzing the
meaning of “property damage” under a commercial general liability pol-
icy (CGL policy), whether loss-of-use damages are recoverable under an
underinsured motorist policy in the case of a total loss of property, the
relevant standards for determining the duty to defend, and the jus-
ticiability of the duty to indemnify. The Texas Supreme Court continued
to evaluate issues implicated by the statutory framework of the workers’
compensation system. Moreover, courts examined issues associated with
extra-contractual claims and the scope of the application of the Stowers
doctrine.
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
In U.S. Metals, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court evaluated issues regarding whether property sustains property
damage by the “mere installation” or incorporation of defective products
and the scope of the “impaired property” exclusion under a CGL policy.2
The insured, U.S. Metals, Inc. (U.S. Metals), sold and delivered to Exx-
onMobil 350 “stainless steel . . . flanges for use in . . . diesel units” at
ExxonMobil’s refineries.3 The flanges were welded to piping before both
“were covered with a special high temperature coating and insulation.”4
Several flanges leaked during post-installation testing, prompting Exx-
onMobil to conduct additional investigation of the products.5 This “inves-
tigation revealed that the flanges did not meet industry standards, and
ExxonMobil decided it was necessary to replace them to avoid the risk of
* B.M., Baylor University; J.D., Baylor School of Law. Partner, Wilson Elser, LLP.
** B.B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas Tech University School of Law. Associ-
ate, Wilson Elser, LLP.
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1. This article encompasses opinions issued between November 1, 2015 and October
31, 2016.
2. U.S. Metals, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., 490 S.W.3d 20, 21–23 (Tex. 2015).
3. Id. at 21–22.
4. Id. at 22.
5. Id.
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fire and explosion.”6 The replacement “process involved stripping the
temperature coating and insulation” (destroying both in the process),
“cutting the flange out of the pipe, removing the gaskets” (destroying
them in the process), “grinding the pipe . . . smooth for re-welding, re-
placing the flange and gaskets,” and then “replacing the temperature
coating and insulation.”7
ExxonMobil sued U.S. Metals seeking recovery of the costs associated
with replacing the flanges and consequential damages for loss of use of
the diesel units.8 After settling the lawsuit, U.S. Metals sought “indemni-
fication from its . . . insurer, Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.” (Liberty).9 Lib-
erty denied coverage for the claim, prompting U.S. Metals to file a
coverage lawsuit in federal court. Eventually, the case reached the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified four questions to
the Texas Supreme Court.10 In its opinion, the supreme court summarized
the issues presented:
[T]he parties’ dispute and the certified questions distill to two essen-
tial inquires. First: did the mere installation of the faulty flanges
physically injure the diesel units when the only harm at that point
was the risk of leaks? Or put more generally: is property physically
injured simply by the incorporation of a faulty component with no
tangible manifestation of injury? And second: is property restored to
use by replacing a faulty component when the property must be al-
tered, damaged, and repaired in the process?11
Regarding the first issue, the supreme court found that the term “phys-
ical injury” under the CGL policy “requires tangible, manifest harm and
does not result merely upon the installation of a defective component in a
product or system.”12 In reaching this decision, the supreme court initially
commented that a physical injury was a separate and distinct concept
from mere injury; thus, logic requires that physical injury be more than a
mere diminution of value inherent in installing a faulty part.13 Finding
otherwise would render the word “physical” superfluous in contravention
of the rules of contract interpretation.14 Moreover, the supreme court
pointed to its own doctrine regarding faulty workmanship claims, where
in the case of defective installation, occurrences were deemed to happen
at the time of damage rather than at the time of discovery.15 The supreme





10. Id. at 23.
11. Id. U.S. Metals did not seek coverage for any damage to the flanges themselves,
conceding that Exclusion K (the “your product” exclusion) barred coverage for that aspect
of the loss. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id. at 24–25.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 27.
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tent with precedent, as it would allow for an occurrence before the time
of actual damage.16 While this had the unintended effect of precluding
coverage for U.S. Metals due to ExxonMobil’s proactive repairs, the su-
preme court reasoned that the wording of the CGL policy was “clear.”17
Thus, the supreme court held that the “diesel units were not physically
injured merely by the installation of U.S. Metals’ faulty flanges.”18
Nevertheless, the supreme court recognized that the diesel “units were
physically injured in the process of replacing the faulty flanges.”19 Thus,
“the repair costs and damages for the downtime were ‘property damages’
covered by the policy unless Exclusion M applies.”20 That exclusion bars
coverage under the CGL policy for “damages to property, or for the loss
of its use, if the property was not physically injured or if it was restored to
use by replacement of the flanges.”21 U.S. Metals argued that “the diesel
units were not ‘impaired property’ and Exclusion M” did not preclude
coverage for the loss of use of the diesel units “because the flanges were
welded,” meaning that the restoration of the diesel units required “much
more than simply removing and replacing the flanges alone.”22 The su-
preme court disagreed:
The policy definition of “impaired property” does not restrict how
the defective product is to be replaced. U.S. Metals’ argument re-
quires limiting the definition to property “restored to use by the . . .
replacement of [the flanges]” without affecting or altering the prop-
erty in the process. That limitation cannot be fairly inferred from the
text itself, nor would it make sense to do so. In U.S. Metals’ view, the
diesel units could not be restored to use by replacement of the
flanges, not only because they had to be cut out and welded back in,
but because of the wholly incidental replacement of insulation and
gaskets. Coverage does not depend on such minor details of the re-
placement process but rather on its efficacy in restoring property to
use. The diesel units were restored to use by replacing the flanges
and were therefore impaired property to which Exclusion M applies.
Thus, their loss of use is not covered by the policy.23
Though Exclusion M barred coverage for the loss of use claims, the su-
preme court recognized that the exclusion did not preclude coverage for
the “insulation and gaskets destroyed” during the repair process.24
In rejecting the incorporation theory, the supreme court adopted an
approach consistent with that of a majority of courts that have evaluated
the issue.25 Moreover, the supreme court remained consistent in its ap-
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 26–27.
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proach to what constitutes “property damage” under Texas law, noting
that “faulty workmanship that merely diminishes the value of . . . [prop-
erty] without causing physical injury or loss of use does not involve ‘prop-
erty damage.’”26
Nevertheless, in finding that the CGL policy provided coverage for the
otherwise undamaged insulation and gaskets that were destroyed during
the repair process,27 disputes and litigation will likely continue over the
scope of coverage for these so-called “rip and tear” or “get to” damages.
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed coverage for rip
and tear damages in Lennar Corp. v. Great American Insurance. Co.,
finding that the costs were “damages because of . . . property damage.”28
In that case, the insured sought coverage for the removal and replace-
ment of a defective Exterior Insulation and Finish System (EIFS). For
some homes, the insured “presented evidence that it incurred other costs
to repair the water damage in addition to the costs to actually repair the
damaged areas . . . [when] windows were broken, driveways were
cracked, and landscaping was damaged to repair the water damage.”29 In
U.S. Metals, the Texas Supreme Court simply concluded that the insula-
tion and gaskets intentionally destroyed to remedy the defective products
were “not impaired property” and that “the cost of replacing them was
therefore covered by the policy.”30 It is unclear whether U.S. Metals fol-
lowed the Lennar precedent, that the destruction of the insulation and
gaskets was covered because it constituted “damages because of . . . prop-
erty damage,”31 or whether the supreme court opened the door for a
broader category of property damage under similar facts.
B. AUTO INSURANCE
In J & D Towing, LLC v. American Alternative Insurance Corp., the
Texas Supreme Court held that loss of use damages are recoverable “in
addition to the fair market value of the property” in the case of a total
loss of personal property.32 The insured, J & D Towing (J & D) is a tow-
ing company that owned a single tow truck. On December 29, 2011, a car
collided with the passenger side of the truck, rendering the truck a total
loss.33 J & D settled with the other driver’s insurer and used the proceeds
from that settlement to purchase another tow truck.
Thereafter, J & D filed a claim arising out of the accident with its in-
surer, American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC), asserting
26. Id. at 27 (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1,
8–10 (Tex. 2007)).
27. Id. at 28.
28. Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.3d 651, 678, 678 n.33 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied), abrogated on other grounds by Gilbert Tex. Const.,
L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2010).
29. Id.
30. U.S. Metals, 490 S.W.3d at 28.
31. See Lennar Corp., 200 S.W.3d at 678.
32. J & D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 677 (Tex. 2016).
33. Id. at 653.
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that the proceeds from the other driver’s insurer did not compensate J &
D “for the loss of use of the truck.”34 AAIC denied coverage, arguing
that under Texas law, loss-of-use damages are available for partial de-
struction of property but not in situations where there is total destruc-
tion.35 J & D argued that making such a “distinction belies common sense
and is out of step with the majority trend in other jurisdictions permitting
loss-of-use damages in total-destruction cases.”36
After an extensive discussion regarding the development of the law on
this issue in both Texas and throughout the United States, the supreme
court sided with J & D, holding that it was illogical for an “owner of
totally destroyed personal property” to have no ability to recover loss-of-
use damages.37 In doing so, the supreme court explained that it was fol-
lowing the modern trend that such damages should be recoverable “in
addition to the fair market value of the property immediately before the
injury.”38 The loss-of-use damage constitutes a “wholly independent . . .
measure of property damage” apart from the damage itself.39 The su-
preme court did, however, caution that in allowing recovery of “loss-of-
use damages in total destruction cases,” it was not granting “a license for
unrestrained raids on defendants’ coffers.”40 Rather, these consequential
damages “must be foreseeable and directly traceable to the tortious act”
but must not be “too remote” or speculative.41 Additionally, consequent-
ial damages “may not be awarded for an unreasonably long period of lost
use,” which indicates the claimant must mitigate its damages.42
C. PROPERTY INSURANCE
1. Fifth Circuit Evaluates Whether Coverage Exists for Claims That an
Insured Was Legally Required to Upgrade His Roof Following Hail
Loss
In Toney v. State Farm Lloyds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit evaluated the proper method for calculating the amount of cov-
ered loss associated with the replacement of a roof.43 Kenneth Toney in-
sured his home with State Farm Lloyds. A hail storm damaged the roof of
the home in March 2012.44 Toney filed a claim, and eventually invoked
the appraisal provision of his policy. The appraiser valued the claim at
$67,431.47.45 A portion of this appraisal included funds to replace the




37. Id. at 657–676.
38. Id. at 676.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 677.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Toney v. State Farm Lloyds, 661 F. App’x 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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argued that local ordinances required the upgrade, and as such, the policy
should provide coverage for the additional expense.46 Though State Farm
Lloyds accepted part of the claim, it declined coverage for that part of the
appraisal award related to roof decking, “citing the January 2013 letter
from the [local] building inspector” stating that Toney was not required
by law to replace the decking.47 Toney sued, and State Farm Lloyds even-
tually won summary judgment in federal district court.48 Toney
appealed.49
The policy required State Farm Lloyds to pay for “‘the legally required
changes to the undamaged portion of the dwelling caused by the enforce-
ment’ of a building ordinance ‘if the enforcement is directly caused by the
same Loss Insured and the requirement is in effect at the time the Loss
Insured occurs.’”50 At the time the house was damaged, Texas had
adopted the International Residential Code (IRC), which required only
that new materials used and repairs performed “conform to the require-
ments for newly constructed” buildings.51 The IRC specifically excluded
those “[p]ortions of the structure” that were undamaged and unaffected
“by the alteration.”52 Toney presented various letters in his defense, in-
cluding an October 2012 letter from the local building inspector as proof
that the replacement decking was required, but the Fifth Circuit observed
that this letter merely cited those portions of the IRC that required new
materials to meet standards imposed by code.53 All other documents
presented by Toney did not, according to the Fifth Circuit, establish that
he was required by law to replace the sheathing on his roof.54 Conse-
quently, the Fifth Circuit ruled that State Farm Lloyds was “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”55
2. Fifth Circuit Finds That No Coverage Applies for a Hail Loss Due
to an Insured’s Failure to Provide Timely Notice of the Claim
In Hamilton Properties v. American Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined whether an insured’s delay in re-
porting a hail claim was grounds for an insurer to deny coverage.56 Ham-
ilton Properties insured its hotel through American Insurance Company
(AIC) under a policy that provided coverage for “all risks of direct physi-
cal loss or damage, except as excluded or limited elsewhere.”57 The hotel
46. Id.
47. Id. at 289.
48. Id. at 289–90.
49. Id. at 290.
50. Id. at 291.
51. See id. at 292.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 292–93.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 293.
56. Hamilton Props. v. Am. Ins. Co., 643 F. App’x 437, 438 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam).
57. Id.
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was allegedly damaged by a hailstorm in July 2009, but Hamilton Proper-
ties did not report the claim to AIC until February 2011.58 AIC denied
coverage, citing the delay in reporting as well as multiple intervening hail
storms, which, according to AIC, could have “caused the damage.”59
Hamilton Properties sued AIC for breach of contract and extra-contrac-
tual claims, which the district court dismissed through summary
judgment.60
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit court noted that “[t]he policy required that
Hamilton provide to AIC ‘prompt’ notice” of a claim.61 Texas courts in-
terpret prompt to require “‘that notice must be given within a reasonable
time after the occurrence’ of the damage.”62 Agreeing with the district
court, the Fifth Circuit found that Hamilton Properties’ unexplained de-
lay in notifying AIC “was not prompt as a matter of law.”63 The Fifth
Circuit recognized, however, that an “insured’s breach of a prompt notice
provision does not” in and of itself preclude coverage under a policy.64
Rather, an insurer must demonstrate “that it was prejudiced” by a breach
of a notice condition.65 Such “[p]rejudice can arise when the failure to
timely notify results in the insurer’s ‘inability to investigate the circum-
stances of an occurrence to prepare adequately to adjust or defend any
claims.’”66
Hamilton Properties argued that the untimely notice did not impair
AIC’s ability to investigate the loss.67 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, observ-
ing that it was “undisputed that . . . [the] delay” had cost AIC the ability
to gather critical evidence, particularly the condition of the hail damage
immediately “before and after” the storm.68 Even if there was no
prejudice from the late notice, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Hamilton
Properties produced no evidence “to establish a prima facie claim for
breach of contract.”69 Texas law requires an insured to establish cover-
age.70 The policy issued by AIC “covers damage by a hailstorm ‘provided
such loss or damage occurs during the term of [the] policy,’” which “was
from February 16 to September 24, 2009.”71 Hamilton Properties identi-
fied no evidence of such damage during that time. Rather, the bulk of the
58. Id. at 438–39.
59. Id. at 439.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 440.
62. Id. (quoting Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass’n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 474, 479
(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Modern Expl., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1988, no writ))).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Blanton v. Vesta Lloyds Ins. Co., 185 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2006, no pet.)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 440–41(quoting Blanton, 185 S.W.3d at 615).
67. Id. at 441.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Data Specialties, Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 909, 911 (5th Cir.
1997)).
71. Id.
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evidence identified only the present condition of the hotel, which would
not “enable a [reasonable] jury to segregate damages” specific to the hail-
storm and the policy period.72 As such, Hamilton Properties’ claim for
breach of contract failed as a matter of law.73
D. COMMERCIAL CRIME INSURANCE
In Tesoro v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether an “unlawful taking” oc-
curred to trigger “a commercial crime policy.”74 The insured, Tesoro
Refining and Marketing Company, L.L.C. (Tesoro), was in the business
of selling petroleum products, and in 2003 began selling fuel on an un-
secured credit line of $25 million to Enmex Corporation (Enmex).75 By
December 2007, Enmex’s account ballooned to $45 million.76 An auditor
contacted Tesoro’s account supervisor regarding the outstanding balance,
and the account supervisor represented that Enmex’s credit account was
“secured [with] a $12 million letter of credit.”77 A month later, a consult-
ant for Tesoro inquired with the same account supervisor regarding the
balance and he produced what purported to be “a $24 million letter of
credit[.]”78 This process repeated itself over the next few months and sub-
sequent forensic analysis determined that the letters of credit had been
generated in a password-protected portion of Tesoro’s own server.79 By
December 2008, with Enmex’s account balance at $90 million, Tesoro
presented a $24 million “letter of credit to Bank of America,” who
promptly responded that the letter was a forgery.80 Tesoro ceased sales to
Enmex, sued, and then settled, ultimately presenting a claim with a proof
of loss to its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company (National
Union), for $15 million under its commercial crime policy.81 The policy at
issue contained “different ‘insuring agreements’ covering specific risks
like employee theft, forgery and alteration, or computer fraud.”82 Tesoro
argued the claim triggered the “Forgery and Alteration” insuring agree-
ment, but National Union disagreed and denied coverage.83 Tesoro then
provided an amended proof of loss, claiming that the claim fell under the
72. Id. at 441–42.
73. Id. With respect to Hamilton Properties’ “extra-contractual claims,” the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s decision that those were not recoverable. Id. at 442. Noting
that where there is no breach of contract, an insured can recover extra-contractual dam-
ages only when an insurer engages in “extreme” actions that cause damages “independent”
of the insurance claim or “fail[s] to timely investigate [an insurance] claim.” Id. The Fifth
Circuit found that neither circumstance was present. Id.






79. Id. at 472–73.
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“Employee Theft” coverage, but National Union still denied coverage.84
The denials prompted Tesoro to sue, and the district court subsequently
granted summary judgment in favor of National Union, reasoning that
the “Employee Theft” insuring agreement did not “cover forgery losses
independent of a theft and instead always required an ‘unlawful taking’ to
trigger coverage.”85 Tesoro appealed.
The Fifth Circuit first analyzed the “Employee Theft” insuring agree-
ment, which provides that National Union will “pay for loss of or damage
to ‘money,’ ‘securities,’ and ‘other property’ resulting directly from ‘theft’
committed by an ‘employee’” and that “[f]or purposes of this Insuring
Agreement, ‘theft’ shall also include forgery.”86 The policy defined theft
as “the unlawful taking of property to the deprivation of the Insured.”87
Tesoro contended that “the district court erred by requiring an ‘unlawful
taking,’” and that the proper reading of the policy was that theft was
expanded by the latter sentence of the “Employee Theft” insuring agree-
ment to include forgery.88 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting
that such a reading isolated the single sentence from the obvious context
of the rest of the section, namely providing forgery as a possible means by
which theft could occur.89 Moreover, Tesoro’s reading would have ren-
dered meaningless a separate “Acts of Employees” exclusion regarding
“employee forgery [of] commercial paper,” since such acts would have
become, by definition, theft and covered under the policy.90
The Fifth Circuit then made an Erie guess regarding whether there was
a genuine dispute of material fact over whether the actions of Tesoro’s
account supervisor constituted an unlawful taking under the policy.91 The
Fifth Circuit noted that Tesoro’s appellate brief was inconsistent in its
characterization of what precisely constituted the loss, but assumed, argu-
endo, that the loss was the fuel sold to Enmex.92 After a brief examina-
tion of the application of Texas theft statutes, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that theft required that “those who consent to . . . transfer” of property
“be aware of the deceptive representation in order to be induced by it”
and that such deception must bear significantly on the decision to transfer
property.93 Assuming, arguendo, that the account supervisor forged the
letters of credit, the Fifth Circuit found there was an “evidentiary deficit”
in Tesoro’s pleadings.94 Tesoro “failed to offer . . . evidence” that substan-
tially demonstrated that “it would have acted differently had it known the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 474.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 476.
90. Id. at 475–76.
91. Id. at 473–74.
92. Id. at 476–77.
93. Id. at 477–78.
94. Id. at 478–79.
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Enmex account was actually not secured.”95 In point of fact, evidence in
the record showed Tesoro “continued to sell . . . to Enmex” when it knew
that Enmex was unsecured and over its credit line.96 As such, no genuine
dispute existed, the district court properly ruled in favor of National
Union’s motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.97
E. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court again evaluated
various issues implicated under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Sys-
tem (WCS). These cases illustrate the strong public policy in favor of the
application of the exclusive remedies and statutory requirements of the
WCS. It appears that the Texas Supreme Court is not interested or other-
wise unwilling to find exceptions or loopholes in the statutory scheme.
1. Texas Supreme Court Invalidates Settlement Agreement Between
Injured Employee and Employer’s Insurer
After an on-the-job injury, Bonnie Jones began receiving workers’
compensation benefits from her employer’s workers’ compensation in-
surer.98 She “made three claims for supplemental income benefits
(SIBs)” in 2011, leading to a disagreement regarding “whether [she] was
entitled to [benefits] for the fourteenth quarter.”99 Following a contested-
case hearing, the hearing officer found that “Jones did not make an active
effort to obtain employment for each week” of the fourteenth quarter
and rejected her claim for benefits.100 An appeals panel upheld the deci-
sion, and Jones sued.101 “The Department of Insurance’s Division of
Workers’ Compensation (Division) intervened after receiving a proposed
judgment approving the settlement at issue” before the Texas Supreme
Court.102 In the proposed settlement, the insurer would make a partial
payment for the SIBs despite Jones’s failure to comply with the require-
ments.103 Both the trial court and appellate court approved the
settlement.104
The supreme court, however, did not agree with the decisions by the
lower courts.105 It began its analysis noting that the “workers’ compensa-
tion regime” had been overhauled by the legislature with the specific pur-
pose of reigning in inefficiencies that had “reached ‘crisis proportions,’”
through minimal “judicial review of agency determinations,” specific ben-
efits formulas, and strict requirements for receiving benefits at the center
95. Id. at 479.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 480.







105. Id. at 613–14.
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of the regime.106 While the Texas Labor Code did allow for settlements,
the supreme court instructed that any such settlement must comply with
the specific formulae provided in both the Texas Labor Code and regula-
tions promulgated by the Division.107 In the case at bar, the hearing of-
ficer “made a finding of fact” that precluded an award of benefits.108
While the Labor Code authorizes settling certain disputes over SIB
awards (e.g., where no disagreement exists regarding whether a worker
satisfied eligibility requirements), this matter did not present such a situa-
tion. As a result, the supreme court declined to approve this settlement or
any settlement that is void on its face.109 According to the supreme court,
to allow otherwise would run counter to the intent expressed by the legis-
lature when it overhauled the workers’ compensation system.110
2. Texas Supreme Court Finds That Independent Contractor Is
Employee Under the Texas Labor Code
In TIC Energy & Chemical, Inc. v. Martin, a Union Carbide Corpora-
tion (Union Carbide) employee, Kevin Martin, lost his leg at a Union
Carbide facility.111 Martin “recovered workers’ compensation benefits
through an owner-controlled insurance program (OCIP) administered by
Union Carbide’s parent company, Dow Chemical Company.”112 Martin
then sued TIC Energy and Chemical Inc. (TIC), a subcontractor that pro-
vided “maintenance services at the [Union Carbide] facility,” claiming his
injuries resulted from TIC’s negligence.113 Relying on the exclusive rem-
edy provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), TIC
claimed that Section 406.123 of the Texas Labor Code provided a “statu-
tory defense as Martin’s deemed fellow employee.”114 In support of its
position, “TIC produced evidence of a written agreement with Union
Carbide that extended workers’ compensation insurance coverage under
the OCIP to TIC and its employees[.]”115 Martin countered that TIC was
an independent contractor under Section 406.122(b) of the Texas Labor
Code, meaning that the exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable.116
The trial court denied TIC’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed
an interlocutory appeal.117
The intermediate appellate court “concluded [that] Sections 406.122
and 406.123 ‘irreconcilably conflict’ because ‘Section 406.123(e) unam-
106. Id. at 611–12.
107. Id. at 614–17; see id. at 612 n.4 (citing generally TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 410.251–.258
(West 2015)).
108. Id. at 613.
109. Id. at 613–14.
110. Id. at 616.





116. Id. at 70–71.
117. Id. at 71.
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biguously states that the general contractor is deemed the “employer” of
the subcontractor for [workers’ compensation] purposes, but Section
406.122(b) unambiguously states that the subcontractor is not deemed an
“employee” of the general contractor for [workers’ compensation] pur-
poses.’”118 The Texas Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s con-
clusion, noting that the two sections can be read in harmony.119
Specifically, Section 406.122 states the “general rule of employee status
for workers’ compensation purposes” while Section 406.123 created an
exception “by which a general contractor [could] become a statutory em-
ployer” of a subcontractor by way of written agreement.120 Martin’s con-
tention that 406.123 was the general rule and 406.122 the exception
created a scenario where lower tier subcontractors could not be employ-
ees for purposes of the statute, thus rendering 406.122 surplus. Such con-
struction would be contrary to both the rules of statutory construction
and HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, where the supreme court had previously ex-
plained that a general contractor who has purchased workers’ compensa-
tion insurance to cover its subcontractors pursuant to a written
agreement is protected by the benefits given to employers under the
WCA.121 Separately, the supreme court rejected Martin’s contention that
the usage of the term “independent contractor” in subsections (a) and (b)
of 406.122 was redundant.122 Lastly, the supreme court rejected Martin’s
contention that reading 406.122 as the rule would “confer a benefit” on
subcontractors “without substantive quid pro quo” as desired by the leg-
islature.123 Instead of simply conferring protection on subcontractors like
TIC, the scheme allowed for all employees of a company like Union Car-
bide to enjoy protection from personal injury claims.124 As a result, the
supreme court found that TIC was entitled to rely on the exclusive rem-
edy defense, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals for judg-
ment in TIC’s favor.125
III. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. STOWERS LIABILITY
A frequent dispute that arises between insureds and insurers is whether
an insurer is obligated to tender its policy limits, pursuant to the Stowers
doctrine, in response to a policy limits demand. The Stowers doctrine im-
poses a common law duty on insurers to exercise ordinary care in han-
dling the settlement of claims in order to protect the insured from a
118. Id.
119. Id. at 76.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 74, 76; see generally HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2009).
122. Martin, 498 S.W.3d at 77.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 77–78.
125. Id. at 78.
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judgment in excess of the policy’s limit.126 To trigger the Stowers duty to
settle, (1) the underlying claim must be covered by the policy; (2) the
settlement demand must be “within the policy limits” and offer to fully
release the insured; and (3) “the terms of the demand are such that an
ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and
degree of the insured’s potential exposure to an excess judgment.”127 Cir-
cumstances involving multiple insureds, multiple claimants or multiple
carriers on the same risk have led to various decisions from Texas courts.
1. Texas Supreme Court Finds Insurers Not Liable for $72 Million
Verdict Because Claim Not Covered by the Policy
The threshold requirement to trigger Stowers liability is that the policy
issued to the insured provides coverage for the loss.128 A recent case from
the Texas Supreme Court illustrates the dire consequences for an insured
or assignee of an insured in the event that the Stowers judgment is based
on a claim that is not covered by the policy. In Seger v. Yorkshire Insur-
ance Co., an accident killed a derrick hand who was working for a drilling
company.129 The parents of the decedent, the Segers, “obtained a judg-
ment against the drilling company.” The drilling “company assigned its
rights against [its] insurers,” who had denied coverage for the claim and
rejected several settlement offers within the applicable limits, to the
Segers.130 Thereafter, the Segers “brought a Stowers action against
[those] insurers” seeking to recover the judgment.131
Years of litigation resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the Segers and
entry of judgment against the insurers for $37,213,592.01.132 In the first
appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
that one of the settlement demands was within the policy limits, but it
“reversed the trial court on six other holdings.”133 In particular, the court
of appeals found that the drilling company’s policy excluded coverage for
injury to a leased-in worker.134 And “because there was more than a scin-
tilla of evidence that . . . the Segers failed to negate the applicability” of
that “exclusion as a matter of law,” the trial court had “erred in granting
summary judgment on [that] issue.”135 On remand, the trial court entered
a judgment in favor of the Segers for $71,696,547. The case was again
appealed, and the trial court’s judgment was set aside.136 This time, the
126. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994); G.A. Stowers
Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929, holding
approved).
127. Am. Physicians Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 848–49 (Tex. 1994).
128. Id. at 848.
129. Seger v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 503 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. 2016).
130. Id. at 392–93.
131. Id. at 392.
132. Id. at 392–94.
133. Id. at 394.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 395.
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court of appeals found “that the evidence was legally and factually insuf-
ficient to establish that” the drilling company had been damaged by its
insurers.137 Specifically, “the Segers relied exclusively on the inadmissible
underlying judgment to prove damages, and that the trial court’s judg-
ment was the result of a proceeding that could not be characterized as a
fully adversarial trial.”138 The court of appeals did not address the cover-
age issues, as “it held that the damages issue was dispositive.”139
The supreme court upheld the appellate court’s decision on different
grounds, observing that before any question could be raised of a fully
adversarial proceeding, the Segers first needed to establish all the neces-
sary elements of a Stowers action, including whether the claim was actu-
ally covered by the drilling company’s policy.140 In particular, the
supreme court found that the evidence conclusively established that the
decedent “was a leased-in worker” for the drilling company, and as a re-
sult, the policy’s exclusion for “leased-in employees/workers” applied.141
Consequently, the “evidence [was] legally insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that the deceased worker was not a leased-in worker,” the
policy did not provide coverage for the damages recovered by the Segers,
and the damages issue was moot under the Stowers action.142
2. Fifth Circuit Finds that Stowers Requires Insurer to Accept
Reasonable Settlement Demand Even if It Does Not
Unconditionally Release All Insureds
During the Survey period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit also addressed issues created by a Stowers claim in OneBeacon Insur-
ance Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Associates.143 DISH Network Corporation
(DISH) informed its attorneys who had handled an arbitration that DISH
was potentially going to pursue a legal malpractice claim.144 The law firm,
in turn, notified its insurer, OneBeacon, of the potential claim, and
OneBeacon responded by issuing a reservation of rights letter and re-
questing that the law firm notify it if DISH pursued formal claims. Subse-
quently, “DISH offered to settle and release the [law] firm in exchange
for OneBeacon’s policy limits.”145 However, DISH would not release the
attorney whose conduct was the basis of the legal malpractice claim.146
OneBeacon declined to accept the demand, noting that there were liabil-
ity issues. OneBeacon subsequently rescinded the policy and filed suit for
a declaration that an “exclusion barred coverage.” The law firm counter-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 392, 395; see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.
1996).
139. Seger, 505 S.W.3d at 395.
140. Id. at 392.
141. Id. at 392–93.
142. Id. at 392.
143. 841 F.3d 669, 677–79 (5th Cir. 2016).
144. Id. at 673–74.
145. Id. at 674.
146. Id.
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claimed and DISH intervened in the coverage lawsuit. DISH also initi-
ated arbitration against the law firm, ultimately recovering an award of
$12.5 million.
In the coverage suit, a jury found that OneBeacon was responsible for
the arbitration award against the law firm, “plus $8 million in past and
future lost profits, $5 million in exemplary damages, and $7.5 million in
additional damages [based on] OneBeacon’s ‘knowing violation’ of the
Texas Insurance Code.”147 OneBeacon appealed, asserting that the dis-
trict court erred by not applying an exclusion to bar coverage under the
policy for the claim and that DISH’s letter offering to settle was a valid
Stowers demand.148
After determining that the exclusion did not apply, and that the policy
provided coverage for the malpractice claim, the Fifth Circuit turned to
the question of whether a letter from a third party plaintiff to the insured
constituted a valid Stowers demand even though it offered to release the
law firm and not the attorney in question.149 While the Texas Supreme
Court has not addressed such a situation, the Fifth Circuit had. Citing its
opinion from Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,150 the
Fifth Circuit followed that precedent and reiterated “that, when faced
with a settlement demand over a policy with multiple insureds, an insurer
fulfilling its Stowers duty is ‘free to settle suits against one of its insureds
without being hindered by potential liability to co-insured parties who
have not yet been sued.’”151 The Fifth Circuit explained that in Citgo, it
had been influenced by the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion from Texas
Farmer’s Insurance Co. v. Soriano.152
The Fifth Circuit specifically declined to follow the holding from a re-
cent Texas appellate opinion where the state court found no Stowers lia-
bility with respect to an offer to release only an “insured employer [but]
not [an insured] employee.”153 That case was distinguishable, according
to the Fifth Circuit, because “the insured employer had explicitly [in-
structed] its attorney” against any settlement offers that did not release
all claims against employer and employees.154 As a result, the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court’s decision regarding the Stowers issue.155
When the First Houston Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Patter-
son, some suggested that decision conflicted with the holdings in Soriano
and Citgo, which instruct that Stowers permits an insurer to enter into a
reasonable settlement, even if that settlement reduces or eliminates the
147. Id. at 675.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 677–78.
150. 166 F.3d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1999).
151. T. Wade Welch, 841 F.3d at 678.
152. Id. (citing Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314–16 (Tex. 1994)).
153. Id. at 678–79 (citing Patterson v. Home State Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., No.
01–12–00365–CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 4460 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24,
2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
154. Id. at 679.
155. Id.
226 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
insurance available for other claimants or other insureds.156 These deci-
sions, however, left open the question of whether Stowers requires an in-
surer in such a situation to accept the demand.157 While Patterson
answered that question in the negative, T. Wade Welch answered that
question in the affirmative. As a result, it appears that a conflict now
exists between Texas state courts and Texas federal courts, which the
Texas Supreme Court may need to resolve.
B. TEXAS INSURANCE CODE CHAPTER 542—PROCESSING
AND SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS
In Quibodeaux v. Nautilus Insurance Co.,158 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit evaluated extra-contractual claims based on alleged
violations of the Texas Insurance Code Chapter 542 (Chapter 542) fol-
lowing an insured’s claim for damages to its properties caused by Hurri-
cane Ike. The properties at issue included a day care center and a
warehouse. After the hurricane, the insured submitted a claim for cover-
age to his insurer, Nautilus Insurance Company (Nautilus). Nautilus dis-
patched an independent adjuster, who provided estimates for less than
the deductibles of $11,367.82 for damage to the day care center and
$62,588.12 for damage to the warehouse.159 Interestingly, Nautilus paid
$12,149.69 for the damage to the day care and $72,720.97 for the damage
to the warehouse, “explain[ing] at oral argument” that it had done so to
resolve the claim in a more expedient manner.160 The insured cashed
both checks, meaning that Nautilus overpaid the claims by a total of
$10,914.17.
The insured subsequently sued Nautilus in September 2010, asserting
“breach of contract, statutory bad faith under Chapter 541 of the Texas
Insurance Code, common law bad faith, violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act, . . . and violation of Chapter
542.”161 Despite repeated requests that the insured submit a demand so
that the matter could be resolved outside of litigation, no demand was
ever provided. Nautilus removed to federal court and filed a motion to
compel appraisal.162
While waiting on the district court’s ruling on appraisal, the parties
conducted discovery, which revealed for the first time that the insured
was seeking damages for “unpaid contents damage.”163 The district court
eventually granted the motion to compel appraisal and the appraiser as-
sessed an amount of damage for the exterior of the buildings, which Nau-
tilus paid. Six months later in November 2013, the insured made
156. J. Price Collins et al., Insurance Law, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 199, 202–03 (2016).
157. Id.
158. 655 F. App’x 984, 985, 987–88 (5th Cir. 2016).
159. Id. at 985.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 985–86.
163. Id. at 986.
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additional “claims for, among other things, damaged contents and lost
business income, which needed to proceed to trial.”164 The district court
denied the insured’s motion to set a trial date and “ordered the parties to
file dispositive motions” regarding the pending dispute. Nautilus subse-
quently won summary judgment and the insured appealed to the Fifth
Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit first affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
for Nautilus on the insured’s breach of contract claim and then turned to
the common law bad faith and Chapter 541 claims.165 Finding that Nauti-
lus had not breached its contract—which is an essential “predicate” for
maintaining a claim for bad faith—and that the insured showed “no ex-
ception to th[at] rule” applied, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment for Nautilus on these issues.166
Finally, the Fifth Circuit considered the insured’s claims for damages
under Chapter 542. The insured argued he was due payment because of
Nautilus’s delay both “between the initial payment[ ]” and the appraisal
and “between the inspection and the initial payment.”167 The first claim
was summarily dismissed as a matter of law, as “[a] plaintiff may not seek
Chapter 542 damages for any delay in payment between an initial pay-
ment and the insurer’s timely payment of an appraisal award.”168 With
respect to the alleged delay in the initial payment in violation of Section
542.056, Nautilus conceded that it had failed to timely notify the insured
of its “acceptance or rejection of the claim within [fifteen] . . . days” as
required by that statute.169 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit reached the
following holding:
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recom-
mendation, which held that the [Chapter 542] claims should be dis-
missed on the ground that they were barred by Nautilus’s timely
payment of the appraisal award. We review for plain error when a
party is “served with notice of the consequences of failing to object”
to a magistrate’s report and recommendation but nonetheless does
not object to the “magistrate judge’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law, or recommendation to the district court.” Here, the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation contained a clear warning about
the consequences of failing to object. Nonetheless, [the insured’s] ob-
jection as to the [Chapter 542] claims stated only that “the Magis-
trate erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim for penalty interest under
§ 542 of the Texas Insurance Code because, as demonstrated in
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment response, they are entitled to that in-
terest for the time period preceding Defendant’s untimely pay-
ments[.]” This objection addresses only untimely payment, which
164. Id.
165. Id. at 987.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing In re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)).
169. Id.
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could refer to only sections 542.057 (timely payment after accept-
ance) and 542.058 (timely payment), not section 542.056 (timely no-
tice of acceptance of claim or of need for more time).170
Nautilus had overpaid on the claim initially in an attempt to resolve the
claim in a “more expedient” manner. The Fifth Circuit found that be-
cause of that overpayment, Nautilus had fully compensated the insured
for both the 18% penalty due for failure to notify the insured of accept-
ance of that claim and for any attorneys’ fees associated with recovery of
that interest.171 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that the insured had not
shown that any delay had “affected his substantial rights[,]” and there
was no reversible error.172
C. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed
whether the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in Texas with re-
spect to claims by third parties. In Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co.,173 the insured asserted claims that State Farm
breached its contract by settling a liability claim against the insured be-
cause State Farm did not conduct a proper investigation of the accident.
After rejecting the breach of contract claim,174 the court of appeals noted
that the remaining claims were “apparently based on the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.”175 The court of appeals explained that the Texas
Supreme Court has found that insurers owe no “common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing” to their insureds with respect to the investiga-
tion and defense of claims by third parties.176 The court of appeals further
noted that the only potential extra-contractual exposure that State Farm
could have in this context was for a breach of Stowers.177 However, be-
cause State Farm both met its contractual obligations to its insured and
settled the liability claim within limits, it had no exposure under that
doctrine.178
170. Id. (fourth alteration in original) (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 988–89.
172. Id. at 989.
173. No. 05-14–01473–CV 2016, Tex. App. LEXIS 2932, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.
22, 2016, pet. denied) (mem.op.).
174. Id. at *7–8; see infra Part IV.C.
175. Martin, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2932, at *8.
176. Id. at *8–9 (citing Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d
27, 28–29 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).
177. Id. at *9–10.
178. Id. The court also found that State Farm did not violate any common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing with respect to Martin’s claim for physical damage coverage to
his own vehicle, as State Farm promptly paid for that damage. Id. at *10.
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IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. DUTY TO DEFEND AND DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
1. Whether Extrinsic Evidence Is Admissible in Determining the Duty
to Defend
To determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, Texas courts
follow the “eight-corners rule,” so-called because “only two documents
are ordinarily relevant to the determination . . . : the policy and the plead-
ings of the third-party claimant.”179 Some jurisdictions allow (or even re-
quire) an insurer to examine facts extrinsic to the pleading in making a
determination on the duty to defend.180 Texas federal courts have consist-
ently recognized an exception may exist under certain circumstances that
would allow an insurer to use “extrinsic evidence” in determining the
duty to defend.181 Texas state courts have, in general, been less willing to
recognize such an exception, likely because the Texas Supreme Court has
never officially recognized that any exception even exists.182 Unexpect-
edly, this issue has been the subject of extensive litigation as a result.
During this Survey period, courts again addressed the issue. In Allstate
County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wootton,183 the plaintiff was injured in a
car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by his son
and owned by the insured. The plaintiff sued the insured but did not in-
clude factual allegations in his pleading regarding his or his son’s employ-
ment status with the insured or whether the plaintiff’s “injuries arose out
of or in the course of [his] employment” with the insured.184 The insurer
argued that it should be allowed to examine extrinsic evidence under ei-
ther a “broad exception”185 or “narrow exception”186 to the eight-corners
rule. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals explained that while the
Texas Supreme Court has never officially recognized an exception, if it
were to do so “it would be the Narrow Exception.”187 Because it was
possible to determine from the underlying pleading that coverage may be
implicated for the damages sought, the court of appeals found that the
insurer was bound by the eight-corners rule in evaluating its duty to
179. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex.
2006) (citing King v. Dall. Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)).
180. Id. at 308–09.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 308 (“[T]his Court has never expressly recognized an exception to the
eight-corners rule . . . .”).
183. 494 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
184. Id. at 832.
185. Id. at 833. Under the “broad exception,” reference to extrinsic evidence is allowed
“if (1) the pleading in the underlying case does not contain sufficient facts to determine
whether coverage exists, and (2) the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue
of coverage that does not overlap with the merits of . . . the underlying case.” See id.
186. Id. Under the “narrow exception,” reference to extrinsic evidence is allowed “if (1)
it is impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially implicated by the pleading in the
underlying case, and (2) the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of cover-
age that does not overlap with the merits of . . . the underlying case. See id.
187. Id. at 833, 834–35.
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defend.188
2. Ripeness of the Duty to Indemnify
Under Texas law, the “duty to defend and duty to indemnify are . . .
separate [and] distinct . . . duties.”189 While the duty to defend is gener-
ally determined from an evaluation of “the factual allegations in the
pleadings . . . [compared to] the terms of the policy,” the duty to indem-
nify is based on the actual facts developed through the litigation.190 In
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin, the Texas Su-
preme Court recognized “that the duty to indemnify is justiciable before
the insured’s liability is determined in the liability lawsuit when the in-
surer has no duty to defend and the same reasons that negate the duty to
defend likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a duty to
indemnify.”191 However, the Texas Supreme Court has also opined that
“an insurer [can] have a duty to indemnify,” even if it has no duty to
defend.192 As a result, many courts have declined to address issues associ-
ated with indemnity prior to a judgment or settlement against the in-
sured. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently addressed
the relationship of these duties and the ripeness of the duty to indemnify.
In the case Solstice Oil & Gas I, L.L.C. v. Seneca Insurance Co., Sol-
stice Oil & Gas (Solstice) contracted with a third party, JAM Petroleum,
LLC, (JAM) to “provide financing as [a] nonoperating interest holder” of
an oil well.193 JAM, in return, was in charge of drilling operations.194
JAM hired OBES Incorporated (OBES) to perform directional drilling
services with the hope of producing oil from a “predetermined under-
ground target.”195 However, shortly after beginning the project, OBES’s
machinery caused “the well [to] deviate[ ] from its planned course by
more than 400 feet.”196 OBES engaged PinPoint Drilling and Directional
Services “to provide [additional] directional drilling [services,] tools[,]
and survey data” to correct the issue, but to no avail.197 A month after
drilling commenced, OBES’s services were terminated.198 The following
month, JAM attempted to reach the target by another route, but found it
“to be a dry hole and the project was abandoned.”199
Solstice sued OBES asserting that its “actions resulted in a misshaped
well that caused ‘physical injury to the well and to the integrity of the
188. Id. at 835–36; see also Shanze Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co., 150 F. Supp. 3d 771,
777–78 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (declining to examine facts extrinsic to the pleading).
189. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997).
190. D.R. Horton–Tex., Ltd. v. Markel Int’l Ins. Co., 300 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. 2009).
191. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84.
192. D.R. Horton, 300 S.W.3d at 741; Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 82.








2017] Insurance Law 231
wellbore.’”200 OBES’s insurers agreed to provide a defense in the law-
suit. However, the insurers also moved for summary judgment, arguing
that an exclusion barred coverage for the property damage caused by
OBES.201 The district court granted the insurers’ motion that they had no
duty to indemnify OBES, and OBES appealed.202
On appeal, the only issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the in-
surers had a duty to indemnify OBES. The Fifth Circuit recognized that
“Texas law only considers the duty-to-indemnify question justiciable after
the underlying suit is concluded, unless ‘the same reasons that negate the
duty to defend likewise negate any possibility the insured will ever have a
duty to indemnify.’”203 The court explained that the “fact that the plead-
ings support coverage under the policy [for purposes of duty to defend]
suggests that there is at least some possibility [the insurers] will . . . have
the duty to indemnify.”204 Due to the potential variance of issues and
facts to be determined on remand, the court held under these facts that
the “duty to indemnify [was] nonjusticiable” at the time the Fifth Circuit
rendered its opinion.205
B. NOTICE
One area of insurance law that continues to see steady litigation in-
volves the notice conditions of a policy. In Gonzalez v. Philadelphia In-
demnity Insurance Co.,206 Gaspar Gonzalez (Gonzalez) was involved in a
motor vehicle accident on August 16, 2010, with an underinsured motor-
ist. Gonzalez was operating his vehicle “in the course and scope of his
employment with Alarm Security Group, LLC”; thus, he was insured
under his employer’s Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Phila-
delphia) policy.207 The motorist in the other vehicle was operating a vehi-
cle her mother owned, which was insured under a policy issued by
Allstate Indemnity Company to the motorist’s father.208 On August 27,
2012, Gonzalez’s counsel gave notice to Philadelphia of Gonzalez’s intent
to seek underinsured motorist benefits under the Philadelphia policy.209
Philadelphia promptly requested additional information regarding the ac-
200. Id.
201. Id. at 222–23. The underlying lawsuit was pending in Louisiana. As a result,
OBES’s insurers were parties to the underlying litigation as a result of the Louisiana direct
action statute. Id. at 222.
202. Id. at 223.
203. Id. at 224 (quoting Farmers Tex. City Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84
(Tex. 1997)).
204. Id. at 225 (quoting Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84).
205. Id. at 226; see also Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. DP Eng’g, L.L.C., 827 F.3d 423, 431
(5th Cir. 2016). In DP Engineering, the Fifth Circuit held that although the insurers had no
duty to defend based on a professional services exclusion, “[t]he allegations in the underly-
ing lawsuits . . . [did] not conclusively foreclose that facts adduced at trial may show [the
insured] also provided non-professional services, which would be covered under the pol-
icy.” DP Eng’g, L.L.C., 827 F.3d at 431.
206. 663 F. App’x 302, 303–04 (5th Cir. 2016).
207. Id. at 304.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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cident.210 On September 24, 2012, Gonzalez’s counsel provided “some of
the requested information, including medical bills . . . of at least
$26,000.”211
On November 2, 2012, Gonzalez signed a settlement agreement “with
the other motorist, her parents, and Allstate for $25,000.00.”212 In con-
junction with the settlement, Gonzalez released all parties from liabil-
ity.213 The Philadelphia policy covered accidents with underinsured
vehicles “‘only if’ Philadelphia was ‘given prompt written notice of [any]
tentative settlement’ with the underinsured motorist and Philadelphia
‘[a]dvance[d] payment to the “insured” in an amount equal to the tenta-
tive settlement agreement within 30 days of the receipt of notifica-
tion.’”214 Eighteen months later, on March 6, 2014, Gonzalez notified
Philadelphia of the settlement and Gonzalez’s continued intent to file an
uninsured motorist claim to recoup medical costs that were in excess of
the settlement amount.215 In accordance with the policy, Philadelphia de-
nied Gonzalez’s claim.216 Gonzalez sued Philadelphia for breach of con-
tract, and Philadelphia removed to federal court.217 Philadelphia filed a
motion for summary judgment.218
The district court held that “Gonzalez’s failure to timely notify Phila-
delphia of the settlement prejudiced Philadelphia as a matter of law and
this prejudice entitled Philadelphia to summary judgment.”219 The “dis-
trict court denied . . . reconsideration” based on Gonzalez’s “fail[ure] to
show cause for not . . . submitting” prior correspondence with Philadel-
phia at an earlier stage in litigation, and noted that the additional evi-
dence would have not changed the district court’s holding.220
On appeal, the issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was whether Gonzalez’s failure to provide notice to Philadelphia
of the settlement prejudiced Philadelphia as a matter of law.221 The Fifth
Circuit relied on previous holdings in Berkley Regional Insurance Co. v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (Berkley I)222 and Berkley Re-
gional Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (Berkley
II).223 The Fifth Circuit reiterated “that such notice provisions,” like the











220. Id. at 304–05.
221. Id. at 305.
222. Id. at 305–06 (discussing Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (Berkley
I), 690 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2012))
223. Id. (discussing Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (Berkley II), 600 F.
App’x 230, 236–37 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
2017] Insurance Law 233
such as ‘the rights to join in the investigation, to settle a case or claim, and
to interpose and control the defense.’”224 The Berkley courts held that
notice given after a dispute is settled prejudices the insurer by depriving it
of a role in the settlement process and the ability to conduct its own in-
vestigation.225 The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s failure to notify
Philadelphia of a pending settlement prejudiced Philadelphia by denying
it “valuable, bargained-for rights, including the rights to investigate the
facts and parties to the settlement, participate in the settlement negotia-
tions, and pursue subrogation.”226 The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed.227
C. INSURER’S RIGHT TO SETTLE
The Dallas Court of Appeals recently examined an auto insurer’s right
to exercise its option to settle a liability claim against its insured, even if
the insured objects to the settlement on the basis that the insurer did not
properly evaluate liability. In Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., Van K. Martin was insured by State Farm Mutual Insur-
ance Company (State Farm).228 Martin’s son was in an auto accident with
Jeffery Lonsdale, who was also insured by State Farm.229 Martin made a
claim for coverage under the collision coverage of his policy “for [the]
damage to his vehicle.”230 Lonsdale also filed a claim for coverage under
Martin’s policy, but did so under the liability portion of that policy.231
After “State Farm settled Lonsdale’s claim,” Martin filed suit, asserting
that State Farm did not even interview his son and acted unreasonably in
concluding his son was at fault for the accident.232 As a consequence of
this breach of contract, Martin asserted that he incurred damages associ-
ated with additional semi-annual premiums from this accident.233 The
trial court subsequently granted State Farm’s motion for summary judg-
ment on Martin’s breach of contract claim and denied Martin declaratory
judgment following a bench trial.234 An appeal followed.
The court of appeals noted that the insuring agreement under the colli-
sion coverage portion of of Martin’s policy gave the insurer the right to
“settle . . . as [State Farm] consider[s] appropriate, any claim or suit ask-
ing for [covered] damages.”235 Finding that Martin presented “no evi-
dence that State Farm did not consider the settlement [to be]
appropriate,” the court of appeals found that the breach of contract claim
224. Id. (quoting Berkley I, 690 F.3d at 348).
225. Id. at 306.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05–14–01473–CV, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2932, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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failed as a matter of law.236
V. PROPER PARTIES TO COVERAGE LITIGATION
A long-standing principle in Texas insurance jurisprudence is that a
third-party claimant “cannot sue the insured tortfeasor’s insurer directly
until the insured tortfeasor’s liability has been . . . determined by agree-
ment or judgment.”237 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals re-
cently evaluated and affirmed this law in the context of a medical
payments claim in Auzenne v. Great Lakes Reinsurance, PLC.238 Great
Lakes Reinsurance, PLC (Great Lakes) insured Snowflake Donuts with a
policy including a medical payments clause.239 The claimant fell in the
restroom on the premises of Snowflake Donuts, requiring him to go to
the hospital where he ultimately incurred over $4,500 in medical ex-
penses. The claimant submitted these to Great Lakes, but Great Lakes
refused to pay, prompting the claimant to sue Great Lakes for breach of
contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code.240
At the time of the claimant’s demand to Great Lakes, he had not sued
or settled with Snowflake Donuts. As a result, Great Lakes moved to
dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, citing that the
claimant lacked standing to pursue the claims at issue in the lawsuit.241 In
response, the claimant asserted that “he ha[d] standing to sue” because
he “was a third-party beneficiary” of the policy and thus was not required
to “first [obtain] a determination of Snowflake Donuts’ liability.”242 The
trial court granted Great Lakes’ motion to dismiss.
The court of appeals began its analysis by clarifying that while the no-
direct-action rule was traditionally discussed in terms of standing, it was
more properly thought of as a ripeness issue.243 Citing Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood of Houston, the court observed that “[a] case is not
ripe when its resolution depends on contingent or hypothetical facts, or
upon events that have not yet come to pass.”244 While “a claim need not
be ripe at the time of filing, the party must demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood” that it soon will be.245 In the case of a third-party claimant,
where there has been no finding regarding the insured’s liability, there is
236. Id. at *7–8. The court also found that State Farm did not breach the contract by
“[r]equiring Martin to pay [a] deductible” under Coverage D of “the policy.” Id. at *7. The
court noted that Martin’s obligation to pay this deductible was expressly required by the
policy terms, and that State Farm was therefore acting in accordance with its contractual
rights in requiring payment of that deductible. Id.
237. See In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 525 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); Angus
Chem. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 138, 138 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
238. 497 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
239. Id. at 36–37.
240. Id. at 37.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 37–38.
244. Id. at 38 (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442
(Tex. 1998)).
245. Id.
2017] Insurance Law 235
no ripeness for a claim on the part of the third party.246 Though the
claimant asserted that the medical payments claims can be distinguished,
the court rejected this argument on the basis that “Texas has consistently
refused to make exceptions [to the no-direct-action rule] based on the
types of claims brought or the status of the parties bringing them.”247
Likewise, the court rejected the argument that the trial court erred by not
presuming the claimant’s status as a third-party beneficiary, noting that
no evidence had been adduced to indicate the claimant was named in the
contract and no argument had otherwise been produced to overcome the
traditional bar against naming a “stranger[ ] to the contract” as a benefici-
ary.248 And, even assuming arguendo that the claimant was a third-party
beneficiary, the claimant’s rights under the contract were not ripe until a
final judgment had been obtained against Snowflake Donuts.249
246. Id.
247. Id. at 38–39 (citing In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (per
curiam); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 244 S.W.3d 885, 888–89 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); Rumley v. Allstate Indem. Co., 924 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 1996, no writ)).
248. Id. at 39.
249. Id. at 39–40.
